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Abstract
Across languages, we find indefinites that trigger modal inferences. Some of these
indefinites, like Spanish un NP cualquiera or the Korean -na indeterminates (Choi
2007) convey indifference on the part of an agent. In this paper, we assess whether a
number of proposals on the market can be extended to account for the indifference
component of un NP cualquiera.
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1 Introduction
Across languages, we find indefinites that trigger modal inferences in non-modal
contexts. Some of these ‘modal indefinites,’ like Spanish algún or German irgendein,
convey information about the speaker’s epistemic state (Kratzer & Shimoyama
(2002), Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2010), among others.) Algún, for
instance, marks ignorance on the part of the speaker: (1) conveys that the speaker is
unable to identify the book that Juan took. Other modal indefinites, like Spanish un
NP cualquiera, the Korean -na indeterminates, the French n’importe qu- indefinites,
or German irgendein, can convey indifference on the part of an agent (Kratzer
& Shimoyama 2002; Zabbal 2004; Kim & Kaufmann 2007; Choi 2007; Choi &
Romero 2008). The sentence in (2), for instance, can signal that Juan took a book
randomly.
(1) Juan
Juan
cogió
took
algún
ALGÚN
libro.
book
‘Juan took some book — I don’t know which one.’
(2) Juan
Juan
cogió
grabbed
un
a
libro
book
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan took a random book.’
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There is by now a substantial body of research on indefinites that convey
speaker’s ignorance or knowledge.1 In contrast, agent indifference implications
have not received as much attention on the literature.2 The present work is part of
a long-term project that aims to investigate agent indifference implications cross-
linguistically. Our goal in this paper is quite modest: we will focus on Spanish
un NP cualquiera and assess whether a number of proposals on the market can be
extended to account for its behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the interpretation
of un NP cualquiera. Section 3 discusses a counterfactual account of the agent
indifference component (Choi 2007), section 4, an extension of the analysis of
German irgendein presented in Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002, and section 5, an
analysis in the spirit of Zabbal (2004). Section 6 sums up the discussion. We
conclude that the first two accounts make wrong predictions when applied to un
NP cualquiera. Adopting the Zabbal-style account would require us to motivate
further some pieces of the analysis, and would leave open a question regarding the
interpretation of of un NP cualquiera in modal contexts. Even though this discussion
is not conclusive, we hope that the issues it raises will ultimately pave the way
towards an analysis of un NP cualquiera.
2 Un NP Cualquiera
Morphologically, the DP un NP cualquiera consists of the indefinite determiner un
and an NP that contains the free choice item cualquiera (3a), which doubles up as
a determiner (3b). It is possible to replace the indefinite with a plural numeral, as
illustrated in (3a).3
(3) a. [DP un ({ dos, tres . . . }) [NP libro(s) [cualquiera]]]
b. [DP cualquier [NP libro]]
Sentences with un NP cualquiera make an existential claim. For instance, (2)
conveys that Juan took a book. Additionally, they can trigger an agent indifference
effect: (2) can convey that Juan chose the book randomly. We will refer to this
reading as the ‘agent indifference reading.’ The sentence in (2) can also signal
that the book that Juan took was not a special or remarkable one. This reading is
compatible with Juan having selected the book carefully, as long as the speaker
1 See, e.g., references quoted in Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010.
2 Some notable exceptions are Choi 2007, Kim & Kaufmann 2007, Choi & Romero 2008, and Zabbal
2004, which is unpublished.
3 The determiner cualquiera has different properties from un NP cualquiera. For instance, it is ruled
out in episodic sentences. For a discussion of this item, which we will ignore in the rest of the paper,
the reader is referred to Quer 2000, Menéndez-Benito 2005, and Menéndez-Benito 2010.
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believes that the outcome is not remarkable. From now on, we will ignore this
‘unremarkable reading’ and concentrate on the agent indifference reading.4
In what follows, we will assess whether some proposals on the market can be
extended to capture the agent indifference reading of un NP cualquiera. We start
with the analysis of Korean -na indeterminates presented in Choi 2007.
3 The Counterfactual Approach (Choi 2007)
Choi (2007) shows that Korean -na indeterminates have an indifference component.
The example in (4), for instance, conveys that John picked a card and that he did
so randomly. Building on von Fintel (2000), Choi claims that this indifference
component comes about via a counterfactual presupposition. In what follows, we
will first present Choi’s account and then discuss whether it can successfully account
for the behavior of un NP cualquiera.5
(4) John-un
John-TOP
amwu-khadu-na
AMWU-card-OR
cip-ess-e.
take-PAST-DEC
‘John took just any old card.’ (Choi 2007: 204)
3.1 Choi (2007)
Choi’s proposal is modeled after von Fintel’s account of English -ever free relatives,
which also have an indifference reading (von Fintel 2000; Tredinnick 2005; Rawlins
2008). The example in (5), for instance, indicates that Zach indiscriminately voted
for the person that was at the top of the ballot.
(5) Zach simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot.
(von Fintel 2000: 32)
According to von Fintel, the indifference component can be given a counterfac-
tual paraphrase: on this view, (5) conveys (i) that Zach voted for the person who
4 Sometimes, the ‘unremarkable’ interpretation corresponds to what Haspelmath (1997) calls a depre-
ciative reading. However, this is not always the case. The sentence in (i), for instance, simply says
that yesterday was a normal day in Juan’s life, and does not convey a negative attitude on the part of
the speaker.
(i) Ayer
yesterday
fue
was
un
a
día
day
cualquiera
CUALQUIERA
en
in
la
the
plácida
placid
vida
life
de
of
Juan.
Juan
‘Yesterday, it was a normal day in the placid life of Juan.’
5 Kim & Kaufmann (2007) present a different account of the Korean -na indeterminates. We will not
review it here.
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was at the top of the ballot and (ii) that if the person at the top of the ballot had
been a different one, Zach would have voted for that person just the same. On von
Fintel’s analysis, (i) corresponds to the assertion of the sentence and (ii) is derived
via a presupposition. This is spelled out in (6), which assumes a minimal change
semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis 1973).6
(6) a. Assertion: Zach voted for the individual at the top of the ballot in w0.
b. Presupposition: all the worlds w′ in which the individual at the top of the
ballot is not the actual individual at the top of the ballot and that otherwise
differ minimally from w0 are such that Zach voted for the individual at the
top of the ballot in w′ iff he voted for the actual individual at the top of the
ballot in w0.
Choi extends von Fintel’s analysis to the Korean -na indefinites. On her proposal,
these indefinites contribute an existential claim at the assertion level and trigger a
presupposition that makes reference to counterfactual scenarios. The example in
(4), for instance, asserts that John took a card and presupposes that in all worlds
where the set of cards is different from the actual set of cards (but that are otherwise
maximally similar to the actual world) John takes a card if and only if he took a card
in the actual world. If the assertion is true, the presupposition can only be satisfied if
John takes a card in all the (maximally similar) worlds where the set of cards differs
from the actual set of cards. This condition does not impose indifference on the part
of the agent just by itself, but it will be satisfied in a world in which John does not
have a preference as to which card to take, and where, consequently, he would have
taken a card regardless of what cards were available.
The analysis is implemented as in (7) below, where the indefinite takes as
arguments a world of evaluation, a set of worlds F (a modal base), and two properties
P and Q. The function min in the metalanguage takes a world w and a proposition p
and returns the worlds in which p is true that are maximally similar to w. Similarity
here is determined with respect to the properties of w: for any worlds w′ and w′′, w′′
is at least as close to w as w′ iff the set of propositions that are true in both w and w′′
is a subset of the set of propositions that are true in both w and w′.
6 It should be mentioned that von Fintel himself casts doubt on the presuppositional status of the
indifference component. In cases like (ii), for instance, the counterfactual component does not project
out of the unless clause, contrary to what we would expect if it were a presupposition.
(ii) Unless Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot, he must have spent at least
five minutes in the voting. (von Fintel 2000: 36)
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(7) a. LF: wh-/amwu-(N)-na(w0)(F)(P)(Q)
b. Presupposition:
∀w′ ∈minw0
 F ∩
 λw′′.
 {x : Pw′′(x)}6=
{x : Pw0(x)}
   : ∃x[Pw′(x)∧Qw′(x)]=
∃x[Pw0(x)∧Qw0(x)]
c. Assertion: ∃x[Pw0(x)∧Qw0(x)] (Choi 2007: 114)
Choi & Romero (2008) suggest that this type of account extends to un NP
cualquiera. In what follows, we will show that the counterfactual component above
does not property characterize the indifference component of this item.
3.2 Issue 1: Free Choice Constrains the Type of Accessibility Relation
According to Choi, the indifference component of -na indefinites can be character-
ized as a free choice effect: (4) conveys that, as far as John’s preferences go, he could
have taken any card. The same applies to un NP cualquiera on its agent indifference
reading. Consider the scenarios in (8-9), adapted from von Fintel (2000). The
sentence in (10) is perfectly fine in (9), but it is inappropriate in (8). We contend that
this is so because (10) conveys that Zach voted for a candidate and that, as far as he
was concerned, he could have voted for any of the three candidates.
(8) When Zach went to vote last Saturday, he had three choices: Barack Obama,
John McCain, and Ralph Nader. He did not want to vote for McCain, but he
had no preference with respect to the other two, so he simply chose one of
the two arbitrarily.
(9) Same as above, except that Zack did not care who he voted for, so he chose
one of the three candidates arbitrarily.
(10) Zach
Zach
votó
voted
por
for
un
un
candidato
candidate
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Zach voted for a random candidate.’
Following Menéndez-Benito (2005), Choi paraphrases the free choice component
of (4) as ‘for any card x, there is an accessible world where John took only x.’ That
is, assuming that the only cards under consideration are the Jack, the Queen, and the
King of Hearts, (4) requires the three conditions in (11) to be satisfied.
(11) a. There is an accessible world where Juan took only the Jack of Hearts.
b. There is an accessible world where Juan took only the Queen of Hearts.
c. There is an accessible world where Juan took only the King of Hearts.
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Choi notes that for her account to derive this free choice effect, we must make
sure that for each individual d in the extension of the NP, the set of accessible worlds
that is being quantified over includes worlds where the extension of the NP is a
singleton set containing only d (Choi 2007: 202 and ff.). To see why, let us suppose
again that the only cards under consideration are the Jack, the Queen, and the King
of Hearts. Now assume that the domain of quantification contains only the worlds
in (12). Suppose, furthermore, that John takes the Jack of Hearts in the worlds in
W1 and W2, and the King of Hearts in the worlds in W3. Assume also that Juan
took one of these cards in the actual world. Given the proposal in (7), (13) below is
predicted to be true and felicitous in this scenario: the assertion is true (Juan took a
card), and the presupposition is satisfied: Juan took a card in each of the worlds in
the domain of quantification. Intuitively, however, (13) cannot describe the scenario
above. The sentence conveys that Juan could have taken any card, but there is no
accessible world in which John takes the Queen of Hearts.
(12) W1 = minw0({w | JcartaKw = {J♥,Q♥}})
W2 = minw0({w | JcartaKw = {Q♥,K♥}})
W3 = minw0({w | JcartaKw = {J♥,K♥}})
(13) Juan
Juan
cogió
grabbed
una
a
carta
card
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan took a random card.’
Given this, Choi argues that we need the domain of quantification to contain the
worlds in (14) (which we will dub the ‘singleton worlds’). If these worlds are among
the accessible ones, then, if the assertion is true, we can conclude that Juan would
have taken any card.
(14) W1 = minw0({w | JcartaKw = {J♥})
W2 = minw0({w | JcartaKw = {Q♥})
W3 = minw0({w | JcartaKw = {K♥})
The assumption that the domain of quantification must contain these ‘singleton
worlds’ is not unproblematic, though. For the domain of quantification to contain
these worlds, we would have to assume that they are as close to the actual world
(where there are three cards) as those worlds where there are two cards. We think,
however, that we do not need to make that assumption when we interpret (13). To
make the problem more dramatic, consider (15). Suppose Juan is an astronomer
who took a picture of a random planet. The sentence can felicitously describe that
event even in a context where we assume that the worlds where there is only one
planet are more remote from the actual world than those where there is, say, only
one planet less than in our universe.
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(15) Juan
Juan
fotografió
photographed
un
a
planeta
planet
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan took a picture of a random planet.’
The next section shows that forcing the kind of accessibility relation above is
not enough. If we include the ‘singleton worlds’ in our domain of quantification,
Choi’s account will make wrong predictions for some examples.
3.3 Issue 2: Wrong Predictions
Consider the following scenario:
(16) Juan is a gambler. He needs to pick a card. He will choose randomly, but
wants to make sure first that the deck is complete. For that, he carries around
a machine that flashes a green light whenever the deck has exactly fifty-two
cards. The machine flashed a green light and Juan picked a random card.
Intuitively, (13) is true and felicitous in the scenario above. However, Choi’s
counterfactual presupposition fails to be satisfied in this context, so the sentence is
predicted to be deviant. To see why, assume that similarity is measured with respect
to the following propositions, all of which are true in the actual world.
(17) p1: that there are fifty-two cards in the deck.
p2: that Juan takes a card if and only if there are fifty-two cards in the deck.
p3: that Juan takes a card.
The presupposition requires all the closest worlds where the extension of carta
is different from the one at the actual world to be worlds where Juan takes a card
(since he actually took a card). As we saw in the previous section, to capture the free
choice effect we must include in the domain of quantification worlds where there
is only one card. Let us now consider the worlds where there is only one card that
satisfy as many propositions in (17) as possible. In all worlds where there is only
one card, p1 is false. Given that, p2 and p3 cannot be both true in those worlds (in
worlds where there are less than fifty-two cards, for p2 to be true, p3 has to be false.)
We then need to consider those worlds in which there is only one card and either p2
or p3 is true, as illustrated in (18). The counterfactual presupposition requires Juan
to take a card in the two types of worlds in (18). Yet, in our scenario, Juan only takes
a card in the Type 2 worlds. The presupposition, then, is not satisfied in this context.
(18)
W1 W2
p2: Juan takes a card↔ there are 52 cards T F
p3: Juan takes a card F T
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We conclude, then, that the type of counterfactual component that Choi assumes
does not properly characterize the indifference component of un NP cualquiera. In
the next section, we try a different way of deriving this component.
4 Extending Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002)
Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) show that German irgendein triggers a free choice
effect in connection with modals, and argue that this effect arises through the
interaction of the modal operator and the domain constraints imposed by irgendein.
They further suggest that the ignorance effect conveyed by irgendein in non-modal
sentences could in principle be captured in the same way by assuming that these
sentences contain a covert assertoric operator. This suggestion was taken up in later
work (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2003; Chierchia 2006; Alonso-Ovalle &
Menéndez-Benito 2010). In what follows, we will explore and ultimately reject a
similar account, on which the modal component of un NP cualquiera also arises via
the interaction with a covert modal.
4.1 Background: Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002
Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) argue that irgendein conveys a free choice effect when
in the scope of a modal operator. For instance, on the narrow scope reading of the
indefinite, the sentence in (19) indicates that Mary was allowed to marry any doctor
in the domain of quantification.
(19) Mary
Mary
darf
can
irgendeinen
IRGENDEIN
Arzt
doctor
heiraten.
marry
‘Mary can marry any doctor.’
(A minimal variation on an example in Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002: 28))
Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) derive this free choice effect as a conversational
implicature that arises because irgendein is a domain widener. On this view, while a
plain indefinite like ein selects a contextually salient set of doctors, irgendein selects
all the doctors in the world of evaluation. Following Kadmon & Landman (1993),
Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) assume that domain wideners are only used when
there is a reason to do so. One of the reasons they consider is avoidance of a false
exhaustivity inference. To see what this means, consider the dialogue below.
(20) a. A: Which doctor is Mary allowed to marry?
b. B: She’s allowed to Mary Dr. Abad or Dr. Báez.
Assume that the doctors under consideration are Dr. Abad, Dr. Báez and Dr.
Cabal. Since B’s claim ranges over a domain that does not contain Dr. Cabal, A
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will conclude that Mary is not allowed to marry this doctor. According to Kratzer &
Shimoyama (2002), the sentence in (19) conveys that there is at least one permitted
world where Mary marries at least one of the doctors (♦(A∨B∨C))7. Considering
the widest domain possible blocks potential exhaustivity inferences. The hearer will
compare the assertion with all the stronger assertions that result from restricting the
domain (♦(A∨B), ♦(B∨C), ♦(A∨C), ♦A, ♦B, ♦C) and conclude that none of them
is true while the others are false. Since the asertion entails that at least one of the
competitors is true, the assertion together with the inference entails that all of them
are. This yields the free choice effect, namely that Mary is allowed to marry Dr.
Abad and Dr. Báez, and Dr. Cabal.
4.2 Extension: Covert Modality
As noted above, Kratzer and Shimoyama’s proposal has been extended to deal with
ignorance effects in sentences where there is no overt modal (Alonso-Ovalle &
Menéndez-Benito 2003; Chierchia 2006; Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010).
According to Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2010), the ignorance effect that
algún displays in sentences like (21) arises through the interaction of a domain
constraint imposed by the indefinite and a covert assertoric operator that quantifies
over the doxastic alternatives of the speaker.
(21) Juan
Juan
cogió
took
algún
ALGÚN
libro.
book
‘Juan took some book — I don’t know which one.’
This raises the question of whether the agent indifference reading triggered by un
NP cualquiera can be captured in a similar fashion. This would amount to assuming
that (i) un NP cualquiera is a domain widener, and (ii) that sentences with un NP
cualquiera contain a covert modal, related to the preferences of the agent. On this
view, the sentence in (22) would have the LF in (23).8
(22) Juan
Juan
cogió
took
una
a
carta
card
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan took a random card.’
7 Notation: ‘A’ stands for the proposition that Mary married Dr. Abad, ‘B’ for the proposition that
Mary married Dr. Báez, and ‘C’ for the proposition that she married Dr. Cabal.
8 The hypothesis that (22) contains a covert goal-oriented modal may not be too far-fetched a possibility.
Some other constructions, like the relative infinitival in (iii) below, can convey goal-oriented modality
in the absence of an overt modal (Bhatt 2006).
(iii) The man to fix the sink is here. (≈ The man whose purpose is to fix the sink is here.)
(Bhatt 2006: 9)
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(23) LF: [ /0Modal [[a card] [1 [Juan [took t1]]]]]
In what follows, we will explore a proposal along the lines above, and ultimately
conclude that this type of account cannot successfully capture the indifference effect
triggered by un NP cualquiera.
4.3 Issue 1: The Indifference Component is not an Implicature
Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002) derive the free choice effect of irgendein as an im-
plicature. This is supported by the fact that the free choice effect disappears in
downward entailing contexts, just like quantity-based implicatures. For instance, by
uttering (24) I convey that I doubt that she was allowed to invite anybody at all (and
not that I doubt whether she was allowed to invited anybody she wanted.)
(24) Ich
I
bezweifle,
doubt
dass
that
sie
she
je
ever
irgendjemand
irgend-one
einladen
invite
durfte.
could
‘I doubt that she was ever allowed to invite anybody.’
(Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002: 14)
In contrast, the indifference effect of un NP cualquiera does not disappear
in downward entailing contexts: the sentence in (25a) conveys that Juan took a
book and that his choice was not indiscriminate, and it cannot be read as saying
that Juan didn’t take any book at all. Similarly, (25b) means that the speaker has
doubts about whether Juan picked indiscriminately (and not that the speaker has
doubts as to whether Juan picked any book at all).9 This contrasts sharply with
the ignorance effect triggered by algún, which disappears in downward entailing
contexts (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010).
(25) a. Juan
Juan
no
not
cogió
took
un
a
libro
book
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan did not take a random book.’
b. Dudo
doubt
que
that
Juan
Juan
haya
has
cogido
taken
un
a
libro
book
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘I doubt that Juan has taken a random book.’
The behavior of the indifference component of un NP cualquiera in downward
entailing environments casts serious doubts on its implicature status. Normally,
implicatures can only be retained in downward entaling contexts with the help of
focus operators or emphatic stress. For instance, Kratzer and Shimoyama provide
9 Zabbal (2004) makes the same observation regarding the free choice effect displayed by n’importe qu
indefinites.
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the example in (26), where stressed irgendein preceded by einfach nur maintains its
free choice component in a downward entailing environment.
(26) Sie
she
darf
may
nie
never
einfach
just
nur
only
IRGENDjemand
irgend-one
einladen.
invite
‘She is never allowed to invite just ANYbody.’
(Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002: 14)
In the case of un NP cualquiera, however, the indifference effect is always kept
under downward entailing operators, without any focus operators or special stress
patterns. To make this compatible with the claim that the indifference effect is an
implicature, we would have to find a reason why this effect is more robust than
implicatures usually are. We do not know what this reason could be. In any event,
we will show in the next section that, even if we were able to come up with such a
reason, we would still not be able to maintain the proposal under consideration. As
we will see, this account wrongly predicts that (22) should convey that Juan took all
the cards in the domain.
4.4 Issue 2: Too Many Actuality Entailments.
The proposal that we are considering assumes that a sentence like (22), repeated
below as (27), has the LF in (28), and, that, therefore, it makes a modal assertion.
(27) Juan
Juan
cogió
took
una
a
carta
card
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan took a random card.’
(28) LF: [ /0Modal [[a card] [1 [Juan [took t1]]]]]
To be able to assess the predictions of this hypothesis, we will need to first
characterize the covert modal that we are positing. Intuitively, the agent-indifference
effect of a sentence like (27) conveys that as far as Juan was concerned, all the cards
were equally good alternatives. This suggests that the modal in (28) is evaluated
with respect to a circumstantial modal base and an ordering source related to the
agent’s preferences. On this view, the agent’s indifference effect of (27) corresponds
to the condition in (29).10
(29) For every card x, there is a world w′ where the relevant circumstances in w
are true and that satisfies Juan’s preferences in w as well as possible, given
the circumstances, and where Juan takes x.
10 This is a simplification. As noted above, to capture the free choice effect, we would need to say that
for each card x, there is a world where Juan took x and only x (see Menéndez-Benito 2005, 2010). In
what follows, we will ignore this component.
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What can the modal force of the covert modal be? Assuming that it is a necessity
modal would predict truth-conditions that are too strong. Consider, for instance,
the sentence in (30). This sentence can felicitously describe the scenario in (31).
However, if (30) contained a covert necessity modal (with the modal base and
ordering source specified above) we would expect this sentence to be inappropriate
in (31): it is not true that in all the worlds where the relevant circumstances obtain
and that are best with respect to what Juan wants, he bought a book — the worlds
where Juan buys a book satisfy Juan’s preferences just as well as the worlds where
Juan buys a cd or a scarf. Assuming that (30) is a possibility statement, in contrast,
does not run into this problem. It is true in (31) that, given the circumstances, and
what he wants, Juan could buy a book.
(30) Juan
Juan
compró
bought
un
a
libro
book
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan bought a random book.’
(31) Juan needed to buy a birthday present for María. He considered buying
a book, a cd, or a scarf. Any of these presents would be fine with him.
Furthermore, any book, any cd, or any scarf would do for him. He ended up
going into a bookstore and buying the first book that he saw.
But the truth-conditions that we predict now are too weak. After all, the sentence
in (30) entails that Juan did buy a book. This, however, is not necessarily a problem.
The covert modal that we are positing is a root modal, and it is well known that
root modals yield actuality entailments in combination with perfective aspect (Bhatt
2006; Hacquard 2009, 2006). For instance, the example in (32), where the possibility
modal poder bears perfective aspect, entails that Juan ate chocolate cake.
(32) Juan
Juan
pudo
could:PFV
comer
eat:INF
tarta
cake
de
of
chocolate.
chocolate
‘Juan could eat chocolate cake.’
Hacquard (2006) argues that actuality entailments arise whenever perfective
aspect scopes over the modal. In her system, the sentence in (32) would have the
syntactic structure in (33). Her semantics assigns to (33) the truth conditions in (34):
that there is an actual past event that is an event of eating chocolate cake by John in
at least one accessible world. To guarantee that the actual event described by (34) is
an event of eating chocolate cake by John in the actual world, Hacquard assumes the
principle in (35)11.
11 ‘τ’ is a function that maps any event e to its running time, ‘t’ picks up a contextually salient time
interval.
344
Expressing Indifference: Spanish Un NP Cualquiera
(33) LF: [past [perfective [ Poss [Juan eat that chocolate cake]]]]
(34) ∃e[e ∈ w0 & τ(e)⊆ t & past(t) & ∃w′[eatw′(e, j,c)]]
(35) Preservation of Event Description Across Worlds:
for all w1, w2, if e1 occurs in w1 and in w2 and e1 is a P-event in w1, then
ceteris paribus, e1 is a P-event in w2 as well. (Hacquard 2006, 2009)
In our example (27), the verb bears perfective morphology. If we assume that
perfective aspect scopes over the covert modal, as in (36), Hacquard’s system will
yield the truth-conditions in (37), which, given the Preservation of Event Description
Across Worlds Principle, would entail that Juan took a card at some point in the past.
(36) LF: [past [perfective [ /0Mod [ [a card] 1 Juan [ took t1] ]]]]
(37) ∃e[e ∈ w0 & τ(e)⊆ t & past(t) & ∃w′∃x[cardw0(x) & takew′(e, j,x)]]
Let us take stock: in order to derive the indifference effect triggered by un NP
cualquiera via Kratzer and Shimoyama’s account we need to assume that sentences
with un NP cualquiera contain a covert modal. And to derive the right truth con-
ditions for these sentences we need this modal to trigger an actuality entailment
(which, assuming Hacquard’s account, amounts to saying that we need to assume
the syntactic structure in (36)). Unfortunately, when we combine these assumptions
with the pragmatic reasoning put forward by Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002), we
automatically derive a number of unattested actuality entailments. Let us see why.
Consider again the proposition in (37), corresponding to the sentence in (27).
Recall that the pragmatic competitors of the assertion are alternative propositions
that differ from the assertion only in that the indefinite ranges over a proper subset
of the maximal domain. Let us assume again that the only cards under consideration
are the Jack, the Queen, and the King of Hearts. The pragmatic competitors of (37)
above will then be the propositions expressed by the formulae that the schema below
determines, where D is a metavariable ranging over the non empty proper subsets of
the set containing the Jack, the Queen, and the King of Hearts.
(38) ∃e[e ∈ w0 & τ(e)⊆ t & past(t) & ∃w′∃x[x ∈D & takew′(e, j,x)]]
The pragmatic reasoning spelled out in section 4.1 yields the implicature that all
these competitors are true. Given Hacquard’s principle in (35), this entails, contrary
to fact, that there is an actual event of Juan taking the Jack, an actual event of Juan
taking the Queen, and an actual event of him taking the King.12
12 Aloni & van Rooij (2007) first noted that Kratzer and Shimoyama’s antiexhaustivity reasoning
predicts that indefinites like irgendein should convey universal quantification in non-modal, episodic
contexts. Here we see that the problem also arises when we have a modal that triggers actuality
entailments.
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5 Importing the Free Choice Effect into the Semantics
In section 4.3 we saw that the indifference effect induced by un NP cualquiera does
not behave like a run-of-the-mill implicature. The interaction of the indifference
effect with negation shows that this effect is not a presupposition or a conventional
implicature – in the sense of Potts (2005) – either. First, while presuppositions
project past negation, the indifference component cannot do so. The example in
(39) is not felicitous in a context where it is taken for granted that all the books are
equally good options as far as Juan is concerned. Second, conventional implicatures
cannot be targeted by negation, unlike the indifference component ((39) conveys that
Juan was choosy). All this leads to the conclusion that the indifference component
is truth conditional. In this section, we will discuss an account that hardwires the
indifference effect into the semantics of un NP cualquiera.
(39) Juan
Juan
no
not
cogió
take
un
a
libro
book
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan didn’t take a random book.’
5.1 A Zabbal-style analysis for Un NP Cualquiera
The analysis that we present in this section is essentially Zabbal’s account of
n’importe qu- indefinites, with one difference: while Zabbal contends that n’importe
qu- must combine with a modal, we will assume that un NP cualquiera introduces
the modal component itself.13
Zabbal adopts the Hamblin semantics for indefinites put forward in Kratzer &
Shimoyama (2002). In this framework, expressions of type τ are mapped to sets
of denotations in Dτ . Indefinite NPs denote sets of individual alternatives, as in
(40a). Other items denote singleton sets that contain their standard denotations
(40b). Functional Application is defined pointwise, as in Hamblin (1973): the result
of combining an expression α denoting a set of functions of type 〈σ ,τ〉 with an
expression β denoting a set of objects of type σ is the set of objects of type τ that
we get by applying each of the functions denoted by α to each of the objects denoted
by β . Given this, the individual alternatives introduced by indefinites into the
semantic derivation give rise to alternatives of a higher type via pointwise functional
application. The combination of the indefinite in (40a) with the verb in (40b), for
instance, gives us the set of propositions in (40c).
13 Jayez & Tovena (2005) also put forward an account for the semantics of n’ importe qu- indefinites.
However, they focus on modal contexts. They argue that the use of n’ importe qu- in modal
contexts crucially differs from its use in episodic sentences, where it receives an agent indifference
interpretation. As this paper is concerned with the agent indifference reading, we will not discuss
Jayez and Tovena’s proposal.
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(40) a. Ja manKw = {x | manw(x)}
b. JarrivedKw = {λxλw′.arrivedw′(x)}
c. JarrivedKw(Ja manKw) = {p〈s,t〉 | ∃x[manw(x) & p = λw′.arrivedw′(x)]}
Alternatives keep expanding until they meet one of several operators that take
sets of propositional alternatives as arguments. The denotation of the sentence in
(41), for example, is the result of combining the set of propositions in (40c) with the
Existential Closure operator in (42): the (singleton containing the) proposition that
at least one man arrived.
(41) A man arrived.
(42) For any set of propositions A: J[∃]Kw,g(A) = {λw′.∃p ∈ A & p(w′)}
Working within this framework, Zabbal decomposes n’ importe qu- into n’importe
and qu-, and proposes that (i) qu- is interpreted in situ as a Hamblin indefinite, while
(ii) n’importe is interpreted as a propositional operator that conveys the free choice
effect. Since n’importe operates over a set of propositions, it cannot be interpreted
in its surface position. Zabbal assumes that it moves and adjoins to the IP node.
Following this proposal, we will assume that the sentence in (43a) has the LF in
(43b). In (43b), the indefinite una carta introduces a set of individual alternatives
(43c), which ‘grow’ propositional via pointwise functional application. Cualquiera
operates over the resulting set of propositional alternatives (43d) by (i) closing the
set existentially and (ii) requiring each alternative to be true in some accessible world
(43e). The LF in (43b) will then denote a proposition that is true in a world w if and
only if Juan took a card in w, and for each card x, there is an accessible world w′
where Juan took x. Assuming that the accessible worlds are those where the relevant
circumstances are true and that are best with respect to the preferences of the agent,
this corresponds to the agent’s indifference component.14,15
14 It is unclear to us how this LF is generated. It could be, as Zabbal assumes, the result of moving
cualquiera. If so, we would need to think about how the trace of cualquiera is interpreted. It is
also conceivable that the LF in (43b) is not derived via movement. Perhaps cualquiera signals the
existence of a covert propositional operator, which ranges over the propositions in (43d). As important
as this issue is, we will have to leave it open for now.
15 The interaction of un NP cualquiera with negation shows that cualquiera must scope below sentential
negation. Assume to the contrary that (39) could get the LF below:
(iv) LF: cualquiera [ no [ Juan cogió un libro]]
Let us assume that no corresponds to Kratzer and Shimoyama’s propositional quantifier, i.e., that
it takes a set of propositions A and returns the (singleton containing the) proposition that is true in a
world w iff all members of A are false in w. Given this, (iv) would convey that Juan did not take a
book and that not taking a book was compatible with his preferences. This is not a possible meaning
for (39). One possible way of blocking the LF above would be to assume that cualquiera can only
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(43) a. Juan
Juan
cogió
took
una
a
carta
card
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
b. LF: cualquiera [Juan cogió una carta]
c. Juna cartaKw = {J♥,Q♥,K♥}
d. JJuan cogió una cartaKw =
{λw. tookw( j,J♥),λw. tookw( j,Q♥),λw. tookw( j,K♥)}
e. JcualquieraKw(A) = λw.∃p ∈ A[p(w) & ∀p ∈ A ∃w′ ∈ Accw[p(w′)]]
This proposal hardwires the modal component of un NP cualquiera into its truth-
conditions. In the next section, we will see that the account faces some challenges
when we consider sentences that contain negation or overt modals.
5.2 Two Challenges
The first challenge that we would like to discuss concerns the status of the existential
component. According to the proposal presented in section 5.1, (44) can have the
LF in (45). The proposition expressed by (45) should be true in a situation where
Juan did not take any card. However, this prediction is not borne out. The sentence
in (44) is only appropriate if Juan took a card (but not randomly). This is a problem
that the proposal presented in section 5.1 shares with the other accounts that we have
discussed, which also treat the existential claim as truth conditional. ((Choi 2007:
187) notes the issue.) The fact that the existential claim persists under negation
suggests that it is a presupposition, rather than part of the assertion. In fact, the
existential component seems to project out of some ‘holes’ (Karttunen (1973)): (46),
for instance, sounds odd in a context where it is not taken for granted that Juan took
a card. The issue is more complex, though: While the sentence in (47b) presupposes
that the addressee has talked to John before, showing that the presupposition induced
by again projects out of the scope of the necessity modal, (47a) does not seem to
trigger any presupposition. At this point, it is unclear to us how to deal with this
pattern within the account that we are exploring.
(44) Juan
Juan
no
not
cogió
took
una
a
carta
card
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘Juan did not take a random card.’
(45) LF1: no [ cualquiera [ Juan cogió una carta]]
(46) ¿Cogió
took
Juan
Juan
una
a
carta
card
cualquiera?
CUALQUIERA
operate over a set containing more than one alternative. This requirement would not be satisfied in
(iv), as no returns a singleton set.
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‘Did Juan take a random card?’
(47) a. Tienes
have:2s
que
that
casarte
marry
con
with
una
UNA
princesa
princess
cualquiera.
CUALQUIERA
‘You have to marry a random princess.’
b. You have to talk to John again.
Another issue that we would like to discuss has to do with the interaction of
un NP cualquiera and modal operators. The proposal in 5.1 predicts that when un
NP cualquiera is in the scope of a modal, we should detect two layers of modality.
Necessity sentences like (47a) above bear this prediction out. The sentence in (47a)
can have the LF in (48). As expected, this sentence conveys that the addressee
is required to marry a princess and to be indifferent as to the choice of princess.
Suppose that, in order to inherit the throne, the prince must marry a princess before
he turns thirty. As the prince will turn thirty in a couple of months, he cannot be
choosy: he may have to marry the first princess that is available. In this context, the
king could felicitously use (47a) to remind the prince of his obligations. However,
the king could not utter (47a) in a situation where the prince is required to marry a
princess, but where he is allowed to be as picky as he wants.16
(48) LF: have to [ cualquiera [ you marry a princess ]]
In cases like (49) below, however, the indifference component seems to dissapear.
When understood as a permission imperative, (49) simply conveys that the speaker
gives her addressee permission to pick any book.
(49) ¡Coge
take
un
a
libro
book
cualquiera!
CUALQUIERA
‘Take any book!’
If permission imperatives correspond to possibility statements, it is perhaps not so
surprising that the indifference component is diluted in these cases. Embedding the
indifference component under a possibility modal should convey that the addressee
is allowed to have preferences. This requirement is very easy to satisfy, and is
certainly satisfied in a context where the addressee is allowed to pick any book.17
However, the account that we are exploring fails to predict the free choice effect that
we observe in cases like (49). This sentence is expected to convey that the addressee
is allowed to pick a book and is allowed to be indifferent as to the choice of book.
16 In this respect, un NP cualquiera contrasts with irgendein (see Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002)).
17 We do not have space here to try to justify this assumption, especially in view of the many recent
developments in the semantics of imperatives (for an overview, see, for instance, Portner (to appear).)
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This does not entail that the speaker gives the addressee permission to pick any
book.18
6 Conclusions
We have discussed three possible ways of deriving the indifference component of un
NP cualquiera. First, we have seen that trying to capture the indifference component
by considering alternatives to the actual extension of the NP (Choi 2007) leads
to wrong truth conditions. Second, we have seen that Kratzer and Shimoyama’s
pragmatic reasoning would derive the agent indifference effect as a conversational
implicature, which is at odds with the fact that this effect does not disappear in
downward entailing contexts. Even if we were comfortable with assuming that the
implicature is routinely imported into the truth conditions, we would predict an
unattested universal meaning for un NP cualquiera (replicating a problem first noted
by Aloni & van Rooij (2007).)
Adopting the Zabbal-style analysis sketched in 5.1. would require us to carefully
spell out and motivate some of its crucial assumptions, in particular the proposed
decomposition of un cualquiera. Assuming that these assumptions can indeed be
motivated, this type of account gets us closer to what we need. But it still leaves
important questions open. In particular, we are left with the puzzle of why the
indifference component disappears in permission sentences. This is an issue that we
plan to address in future work.
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